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To Hire or Not to Hire: What Silicon Valley
Companies Should Know About Hiring
Competitors' Employees
by
HANNA BUI-EVE*

Introduction
Silicon Valley, thirty miles south of San Francisco, is the world's
technology hub. There are more start-ups in key areas like networking,
wireless communications, multimedia, and internet applications here than
anywhere else in the world.' This technological production has transformed the Silicon Valley into one of the most important moneygenerating regions of America. In 1994, Silicon Valley firms surpassed
$106 billion in sales2 and were expanding their markets internationally,
most notably to the Pacific Rim's booming markets. By 1996, the Valley

achieved its status as the nation's largest source of exports.3 More than

131,000 jobs have been created since 1992,' totaling 900,000 by 1996. 5

Silicon Valley also boasts the nation's highest average wages of nearly
$45,000.6

* J.D. candidate, 1997, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.S.
Economics, 1988, University of California, Davis. The author gained extensive insight into
hiring practices of Silicon Valley high-technology companies from her experience as a technical
recruiter prior to attending law school. The author wishes to thank Riaz Karamali, Esq., JiYoung Lee, and Erin Giacoppo for their input and encouragement; the HIJ team for its editing
effort; and Gibson Dunn & Crutcher L.L.P. for supplying the resources for this Note. This
Note is dedicated to my dear husband Dennis Gregory Eve and my mother Huong Thi Huynh.
1. See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, at vii (1994).
2. See id. at ix.
3. Telephone interview with Stephen Levy, Director of Studies, Center for Continuing
Study of California Economy. The Silicon Valley boasted $35 billion in exports, compared to
$826 billion for the nation. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
1996 (116th ed.).
4. See Scott Thurm, Silicon Valley: Victim Of Its Own Success, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEws, Jan. 13, 1997, at 1E.
5. See Levy, supranote 3.
6. See Thurm, supranote 4.
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Many observers believe that the success of the Silicon Valley has
been a result of a unique "regional network-based industrial system that
promotes collective learning and flexible adjustment among specialized
producers of ... related technologies."' The Valley's fluid industrial
structure accommodates rapid dissemination of information and technological changes. 8 The region's networks operate as a kind of metaorganization through which engineers, in shifting combinations, create
technological advances. 9 Engineers move between firms and projects
frequently, taking the knowledge, skills, and experience acquired at their
previous jobs, and then using them as building blocks in their new jobs. a0
Indeed, job-hopping has become the norm, with job tenure averaging
about two years. I" One engineer explained the ease of changing jobs in
the Silicon Valley as follows:
If you left Texas Instruments for another job, it was a major psychological move, all the way to one coast or the other, or at least as far as
Phoenix. Out here, it wasn't that big a catastrophe to quit your job on
Friday and have another job on Monday .... You didn't necessarily
even have to tell your wife. You just drove off in another direction on
Monday morning. You didn't2 have to sell your house, and your kids
didn't have to change schools.1
This accumulation of technical knowledge enhances the viability of
Silicon Valley start-ups and reinforces a shared technical culture. 3 Indeed, the speed of the diffusion of technical skills and know-how is the
key to the Silicon Valley's success. 4
The California courts have contributed to the Silicon Valley's success by allowing employee mobility to take place. The courts have
thwarted employers' attempts to restrain employees from jumping ship.'
As a result, most employers have come to accept a high turnover rate as a
cost of doing business in the region. 6 Thus, engineers move between
7.

SAXENIAN,

supra note 1, at 2; see, e.g., RICHARD GORDON, INNOVATION,

INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY REGIONS, in INNOVATION NETwoRKS:

SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE (R. Camagni ed., 1991) (contending that the flow of information and
ideas between companies is the key to innovation); Richard C. Levin, Appropriability, R&D
Spentng, and TechnologicalPerformance, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 427, (1988), (finding that
spillovers of technology between companies may play an important role in rapid technological
progress).
8. See SAXENIAN, supra note 1, at 8-9.
9. See id. at 37.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 34-35.
12. Id. at 35.
13. See id. at 37.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 35. Indeed, "efforts to take legal action against departed employees proved
inconclusive or protracted." Id.
16. See id.
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firms "without the alienation that might be expected with such a high degree of mobility.""'
Indeed, this unique employment mobility contributes to the success
of the Silicon Valley and distinguishes it from other less successful technology areas. 18 For example, the Route 128 region in the Boston area
(hereinafter "Route 128") had exhibited "technological vitality, entrepreneurship and extraordinary economic growth" during the 1970's. 9 By
the end of the 1980's, however, Route 128 lost its dominance in computer production to the Silicon Valley.' Observers believe that Route
128's decline was due to its industrial system which consisted of independent self-contained firms, which allowed little interaction between
them."- "Employees in Route 128 firms tended to be loyal to the firm,
and generally expected to stay for the long term, working their way up
the corporate hierarchy and retiring with a comfortable pension."' This
low employment mobility rate was due to the region's culture and geography. The culture of the Route 128 region was one in which secrecy
and corporate loyalty governed the relationship between the individual
and the firm.23 The geography of Route 128 contributed to and reinforced the independent firm-based industrial system; companies were
"scattered widely along the Route 128 corridor... with miles of forest,
lakes, and highways separating them."24 This geographical and cultural
separation made it difficult for engineers of different firms to exchange
technological information and to change jobs.' These factors resulted in
low employment mobility26 and a corresponding slower adjustment pace
to changes. Accordingly, the "independent firm-based industrial system"
of Route 128 limited the firms' ability to adapt quickly to changing competitive conditions. 27 On the other hand, the unique "network-based industrial system" of the Silicon Valley has accommodated fast changes,
sustaining the region's economic and technological vitality.

17. Id. at 37.
18. See, e.g., id. (comparing the Route 128 region to the Silicon Valley).
19. See id. atl.
20. See id. at 2.
21. See id. at ix-x, 59-82.
22. Id. at 77.
23. See id. at 59.
24. Id. at 60.
25. See id. at 61. On the contrary, the geographic proximity of firms in the Silicon Valley
facilitated occupational mobility. "'People change jobs out here without changing car pools,'"
said one executive. Id.
26. See, e.g., id. at 75. Indeed, Digital Equipment Technology, one of the main players
in the Route 128 region, boasted a turnover rate among the lowest in the computer industry.
See id. at 75.
27. See id. at 9.
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Alarmingly, lawsuits are threatening the Valley's valuable networks.

After two decades of amicable farewells, high technology employers in
the Silicon Valley are replacing their blessings for departing employees
with litigation. Recent high profile cases include the suit filed by Informix, a database company, which accused the database giant Oracle of
stealing its trade secrets by raiding a team of Informix's key engineers.'
Similarly, chip manufacturer Advanced Micro Devices ("AMD") sued
Hyundai, seeking to prevent former AMD employees now working for

Hyundai from performing certain tasks.29 This phenomenon is likely a
result of the heated pace of competition among Silicon Valley companies,
forcing them to preserve their competitive advantage by protecting their
intellectual property more aggressively."
The current trend of increased litigation may undermine the founda-

tion of the Silicon Valley's success31 by chilling companies from aggressively competing for experienced engineering talent. Furthermore, litigation can be extremely disruptive to a company's business.32 It takes
time, drains resources, and distracts employees and employers from what
they do best-developing new technology.3 3 Yet, California law clearly

allows competitors to solicit each other's employees except in a few narrow circumstances when employers use "unfair or deceptive means" or
engage
in "concomitant, unconscionable conduct" to effectuate the hir34
ing.
This Note will address these circumstances, examine the employer's
rights and duties in specific situations, and recommend practices that will
28. See Jodi Mardesich, Battle on Trade Secrets Oracle Sued: Informix Claims Database
Giant Lured Engineers To Get ProprietaryInformation, SAN JosE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 25,
1997, at 1C.
29. See Anthony Caltado, Hyundai Proceeds, Despite AMD, ELEcTRONIC BuYER's
NEWS, May 13, 1996, at 2.
30. See Pascal W. DiFronzo, When Lips Aren't Sealed, LEGAL TIMES, April 8, 1996, at
46.
31. Caltado, supra note 29 (citing Sam Young, Vice President of Marketing for the Flash
Division at Hyundai Electronics America, Sunnyvale, Cal.).
32. Lawrence F. Carnevale et al., Anti-Compete Pacts Iffy, NAT'L L.J., June 17, 1996, at
D1.
33. See Caltado, supra note 29.
34. Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 25-26 (1968) (stating that defendant company committed no wrong in hiring away its competitor's employees because the interests of the
employee in his own mobility and betterment are deemed paramount to the competitive business
interest of the employers); see also Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d, 573, 577 (1994) ("[Competitors may solicit another's employees if they do not
use unlawful means or engage in acts of unfair competition"); Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley
Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal. 1965) (holding that employment contracts which prohibit an
employee from working for a competitor are invalid unless necessary to protect the employer's
trade secrets); Buxbom v. Smith, 145 P.2d. 305, 310 (Cal. 1944) ("[lIt is not ordinarily a tort
to hire the employees of another for use in the hirer's business.").
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help employers avoid and deal effectively with potential lawsuits. Part I
offers an analysis of the causes of action that may arise from certain hiring practices. It provides a summary of California state law governing
the hiring process and, where needed, supplements California law with
the law of the Ninth Circuit, and of other jurisdictions, both state and
federal. Part II provides a hypothetical which represents the typical hiring process in the Silicon Valley. The liability of the parties in the hypothetical is analyzed according to the law discussed in Part I. Part III
proposes guidelines in the recruiting and hiring process in the form of a
check list of recommended practices in order for hiring employers to
avoid liability. Finally, this Note concludes that California courts should
continue the pro-competition tradition.
I. Analysis of Potential Causes of Action
The recent boom in the Silicon Valley has created a problem of unequal supply and demand for technical employees. 35 Jobs are "going begging" because there are more jobs than people to fill them.3 6 Thus, "to
protect their competitive edge, employers are increasingly resorting to
lawsuits to prevent valued employees from taking similar jobs with rival
companies." 37 For example, in January of 1997, Informix Software, Inc.
filed a lawsuit against its arch-rival Oracle Corporation and eleven former
Informix employees.38 Informix alleged that Oracle lured away these
eleven engineers "to gain expertise and catch up in the hotly competitive
market for corporate database software." 39 Oracle vehemently denied
this allegation, maintaining that the hiring simply reflected an interest in
attracting good employees.' The employees, also named as defendants
in the lawsuit, called Informix's lawsuit against them an "infringement of
their freedom of choice."41 They explained that they left Informix for
Oracle because they believed that Oracle is a better-managed company
with stronger research and development.42
This case illustrates the potential conflict between the three parties:
the departed employee, his or her former employer, and his or her new
employer. A typical suit begins with the departure of an employee to

35. See Michele Hostetler, Area Rings Up Plethora of Telecom Work, THE BUSINESs
JOURNAL-SAN JOSE, March 25, 1996, at 1.
36. See id.
37. See DiFronzo, supra note 30, at 46.
38. See Mardesich, supra note 28.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. See id.
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further his career interests in the employ of a competitor. 43 Fearing possible disclosure of its technological know-how, loss of the employee's
expertise as well as a subsequent loss of its competitive advantage, the
former employer sues to enjoin the disclosure or use of its trade secrets
or to enjoin the departed employee from assuming his responsibilities in
his new job.' The most common causes of action advanced by former
employers against their departed employees and the hiring employers include unfair competition, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of employment
contract, and trade secret misappropriation.45 These causes of action will
be analyzed seriatim in this section.
A.

Unfair Competition

Generally, competitors may hire away another's employees if they
do not use unfair or deceptive means, or engage in some concomitant or
unconscionable conduct in the hiring process.46 In unfair competition
cases, it is not the defendant's hiring of plaintiff's employees which is
objectionable; rather, it is the use of improper means to solicit the employees which is punishable. The California Business and Professions
Code defines unfair competition as an "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice." 4' Courts have broadly construed unfair competition to include a number of causes of action such as misappropriation of
trade secrets, breach of duty of loyalty, and other unfair practices that do
not give rise to a recognizable cause of action.48 Thus, the unfair competition claim often overlaps other legal theories. Plaintiffs usually advance the unfair competition claim as a residual cause of action because
this cause of action covers allegations that do not fit within any of the established legal principles.49
An example of judicial analysis of an unfair competition claim is
Buxbom v. Smith."0 In that case, the court determined that breaching a
See Robert Alan Spanner, Leaving with Secrets, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 11, 1995, at 47.
44. See id. The departed employee sees the suit as an infringement on his right to make a
living, while the new employer views such a suit as anti-competitive litigation. See id.
45. Id.
46. See Metro Traffic Control, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 577; Diodes, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26;
43.

Muggill, 398 P.2d at 149; Buxbom, 145 P.2d at 310.
47. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997).

48. See Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1477 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that
under California law, unfair competition includes anything that can be called a business practice
and is also forbidden by law); see also Courtesy Temp. Servs., Inc. v. Camacho, 272 Cal.
Rptr. 352, 360 (1990) (holding that misappropriation of plaintiff's customer list should be enjoined as unfair competition even if it did not qualify as a trade secret under the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act).
49. See Bureerong, 922 F. Supp. at 1477.
50. 145 P.2d. 305 (Cal. 1944).
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contract to facilitate the hiring of a competitor's employees constituted
unfair competition." The plaintiff in Buxbom was the owner of a business engaging in the distribution of fliers, newspapers and advertisers.5 2
Defendants entered into two contracts with plaintiff under which plaintiff
was to handle the publication and distribution of defendants' newspaper.5 3
Immediately after entering into the contracts with defendants, plaintiff
enlarged his distributing crews, hiring additional supervisors to prepare to
handle the distribution of 40,000 copies of defendants' shopping news. 4
Shortly thereafter, defendants canceled the distribution contract and hired
away plaintiff's distributing crews and supervisors.5 5 The court held that
defendants were liable not only for breach of contract but also for unfair
competition.5 6 The court recognized that the defendants gained an unfair
advantage over the plaintiff by deliberately inducing plaintiff to build up
his distributing business, and then, having acquired the knowledge of
plaintiff's business and methods and records through the contractual relationship, terminating their relationship with plaintiff, and hiring his
crews. 7 Accordingly, breaching a contract to facilitate raiding a competitor's employees is an example of unfair competition.
Another commonly claimed unfair practice is predatory hiring: hiring away a competitor's employee solely to destroy its business.5" "In
such a case, the defendant does not seek the services of gifted or skilled
employees as such, but aims to cripple, destroy or misappropriate a competitor's business organization." 9 Because predatory hiring is rooted in
both antitrust law and common law, plaintiffs have advanced this type of
claim under both theories. Under antitrust theory, 6° a plaintiff claiming
predatory hiring must establish three elements: (1) defendant has a monopoly power in the relevant market; (2) defendant hired away its competitor's employees for the sole purpose of denying them to a competitor;
and (3) defendant's actions resulted in causal antitrust injury. 61 The
Ninth Circuit has strictly construed the "sole purpose" element; as long
as the employer does not hire the competitor's employees for the sole
purpose of destroying the competitor, it will not be held liable for preda51. See id. at 310-11.
52. See id. at 306.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 311.
57. See id.
58. See Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 914 F.2d 1256, 1258
(9th Cir. 1990).
59.

2 RUDOLPH CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND

MONOPOLIES § 9.03 at 141 (Louis Altman ed., 4th ed. 1996) (citation omitted).
60. See UniversalAnalytics, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1257.
61. See id. at 1258.
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tory hiring.62 Thus, even if one of the company's purposes for hiring its
competitor's employees is to injure
the competitor's business, the com63
pany has committed no wrong.
The Ninth Circuit thoroughly analyzed a predatory hiring claim under antitrust theory in UniversalAnalytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler
Corp.'

In that case, defendant hired five of plaintiff's six key technical

employees. To support its claim, plaintiff introduced a memo from defendant's executive vice president, which read:
This guy came through some months ago, and we turned him down because he didn't give us a warm feeling.... Since then, Nima B. [a
prior employee of plaintiff] has given him a strong endorsement. As
Nima is a winner, this is important. Also we wound UAI [plaintiff]
again, and Layfield has shown that he is hard-nosed enough to fire
someone who does not work out. 65
The court held that the four words "we wound UAI again" were in-

sufficient to establish predatory intent; although one reason for the hiring
was to frustrate the competitor, defendant's primary motivation was to
obtain a productive employee for itself.'

The court also stated that evi-

dence that the new employee is put to use in his new job can exonerate
the hiring employer of a predatory hiring claim.67 Thus, a predatory
claim based on antitrust law is very difficult to establish because a plaintiff has to show not only that defendant has monopoly power, but also
that defendant attempts to gain or maintain that illegitimate power by

hiring away plaintiff's employees. 6"

Similar to antitrust law, a plaintiff claiming predatory hiring under

common law must show that the sole purpose for defendant's hiring away
plaintiff's employees is to cripple plaintiff's business.69

62. See id. at 1258-59; cf. Northwest Power Products, Inc. v. Omark Industries, Inc., 576
F.2d 83, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring plaintiff who advances a predatory claim under antitrust law to show adverse impact on the market in addition to showing that defendant used unfair means).
63. See Universal Analytics, 914 F.2d 1259.
64. See id.
65. Id. (emphasis in original).
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1257.
69. See Gunter v. Astor, 4 J.B. Moore, 12 (1819) (defendant ruined plaintiff's business by
enticing plaintiff's employees by entertaining them lavishly and offering them higher wages);
Sugar Creek Creamery Co. v. Momence Milk Coop. Ass'n, 37 Trademark Rep. 851 (E.D. Ill.
1947) (defendant sought to deprive plaintiff of his key employees, contractors and buyers);
Driver v. Smith, 89 N.J. Eq. 339, (N.J. 1918) (defendant enticed plaintiff's employees to leave
with the intention to drive plaintiff out of business); International Tailoring Co. of N.Y., Inc.
v. Lukas, 64 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (defendant induced employees of plaintiff to breach
their employment contract and work for defendant).
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Under both antitrust and common law theories, the means used in

the hiring process can provide circumstantial evidence of a predatory
purpose.7"

Wrongful means include targeting recruiting efforts exclu-

sively at a particular competitor" or enticing a competitor's employees by
offering unwarranted significant monetary rewards.' Courts may view
targeting the recruiting efforts exclusively at one competitor as an attempt
to raid the competitor's employees to drive the competitor out of busi-

ness.

However, evidence that an employment agency placed the em-

ployee, without a direction from the hiring employer to recruit exclu-

sively from one source, can negate this charge. 3 For example, the
Universal Analytics court noted that the employees were not sought out
by the defendant company, but rather placed at the defendant company by
employment agencies, and refused to find defendant liable for predatory
hiring.74 The district court below also dismissed plaintiff's allegation that
defendant conspired with the employment agencies to deplete plaintiff's
crucial talent, because defendant did not direct the agencies to seek em-

ployees from any particular source or to target certain employees of

plaintiff.7 5 Accordingly, evidence that the hiring employer used different

venues to obtain employees can exculpate the hiring employer from a
predatory hiring charge.76

Some federal courts, including the Ninth Circuit, as well as some
state courts outside California, have held that, like targeted recruiting,

significant monetary rewards disproportionate to the new employee's
skills and experience are evidence of predatory hiring.' One state court
in North Carolina noted that an offer to pay a new employee's legal expenses in defending a potential action by the former employer was evidence that helped to establish wrongful intent.7' On the other hand, the
70. See Medtronic Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1467 (D. Minn.
1990)(offering excessive compensation to employees); United Lab., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 370
S.E.2d 375, 387-88 (N.C. 1988) (paying employee's legal costs); Universal Analytics, 914
F.2d at 1259 (directing employment agency to raid employees of competitor).
71. See Universal Analytics, 914 F.2d at 1259.
72. See Medtronic Inc., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467.
73. See Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 707 F. Supp. 1170,
1174 (C.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd 914 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1990).
74. See UniversalAnalytics, 914 F.2d at 1259.
75. See Universal Analytics, 707 F. Supp. at 1174-76.
76. Id.
77. Medtronics Inc., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467 (offering salaries designed not as reasonable compensation but intended to harm or destroy plaintiff constitutes an actionable claim);
United Lab., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 370 S.E.2d 375 (N.C. 1988), aff'd 437 S.E.2d 374 (N.C.
1993).
78. See Kuykendall, 370 S.E.2d at 387-88. In that case, one of plaintiff's sales representatives went to work as a sales representative of a competitor. See id. at 377-378. In his new
job, the sales representative solicited the same customers he had called on while employed by
plaintiff. See id. at 387. The competitor, aware that a non-competition covenant existed be-
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Ninth Circuit found that a salary increase of less than 20% was commen-

surate with the employees' specialized programming skills, such that the
increase was not evidence of predatory hiring intent.79 Thus, evidence

that the hiring employer "bought" the employees of its competitor may be
used to infer a predatory hiring intent.
Although California state courts have not addressed these types of
wrongful conduct, they likely would adopt the rules articulated by the

Ninth Circuit and the other federal and state courts when evaluating
claims under both antitrust law and common law, because these rules are

consistent with a pro-competition policy. For example, the courts' "sole
purpose" requirement furthers California's interest in allowing competi-

tors to solicit each other's employees. 80 The sole purpose requirement is

sensible for several reasons. It permits the hiring of a competitor's employees even if such hiring results in economic injury to the competitor.
When an employee leaves, the former employer must expend resources
to find and train a replacement. Thus, without the "sole purpose" requirement, employers could never hire experienced employees because
doing so would undoubtedly injure the employees' prior employers. In
addition to articulating the "sole purpose" test, the Universal Analytics
court identified evidence that could be used to defeat a predatory hiring

charge, such as whether the employee is put to use." Because employees
usually change jobs to seek career advancement, they would not accept
new jobs where their knowledge, skills and experience are not put to
use.' 2 Thus, employees' interests in their own mobility and betterment,

together with market forces, ensure efficient utilization of employees.
tween plaintiff and the sales representative, agreed to pay any legal costs the sales representative
would incur in breaching the covenants. See id. at 387-88. The court stated that the competitor's agreement to pay for legal fees might lend support to the proposition that the competitor
hired the representative for a wrongful purpose. See id. at 388.
79. See UniversalAnalytics, 914 F.2d at 1259.
80. See Metro Traffic Control Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 577
(Ct. App. 1994) ("Competitors may solicit another's employees if they do not use unlawful
means or engage in acts of unfair competition."); Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 26
(Ct. App. 1968) (a company commits no wrong in hiring away its competitor's employees because "[tlhe interests of the employee in his own mobility and betterment are deemed paramount to the competitive business interests of the employers"); Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelly
Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal. 1965) (employment contracts which prohibit an employee from
working for a competitor are invalid "unless they are necessary to protect the employer's trade
secrets"); Buxbom v. Smith, 145 P.2d 305, 310 (Cal. 1944) ("It is ordinarily a tort to hire the
employees of another for use in the hirer's business.")
81. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text (discussing targeted recruiting and unreasonably high job offers).
82. One can argue that the employees would accept such a job if they are paid a significant
amount of money. However, "buying" employees to drive their prior employer out of business
also violates the law. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing unreasonably
high level of compensation).
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Furthermore, determining whether an employee is used effectively or efficiently would force the court to second-guess the employer's business
decision. Because the sole purpose rule makes sense, California courts
should require a plaintiff claiming predatory hiring under either antitrust
law or common law to prove that a defendant has no interest in using the
employees' talents, and that, instead, defendant's sole purpose in hiring
away plaintiff's employees is to destroy plaintiff's business.
Accordingly, competitors may hire away another's employees if they
do not use in the hiring process such unfair means as targeted recruiting
or offering excessive monetary rewards for the sole purpose of driving
their competitors out of business.
B.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Because the employees' conduct may implicate the employer in
wrongdoing, the employer must understand what types of conduct are
considered unacceptable.
Corporate officers and directors owe fiduciary duties to their employer.83 Non-officer employees may have similar duties of loyalty to
their employer under the principles of agency law. ' Thus, it is unacceptable for a departing employee to transfer his loyalty to a new employer while still employed by his current employer.8"
The mere fact that an employee or officer makes preparations to
compete against his current employer before resigning is insufficient to
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. 6 On the other hand, helping one's
new employer to recruit one's co-workers by supplying their salary information to the new employer would constitute a breach. 7 In BancroftWhitney Co. v. Glen, Glen, the president of Bancroft-Whitney, accepted
an offer of employment from Bender, a rival company. 8 Before leaving
his employment with Bancroft-Whitney, Glen approached a number of
Bancroft-Whitney's employees about accepting employment also with
Bender. 9 He revealed their names and salaries to Bender and caused
83. See Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 934-35 (Cal. 1966).
84. See Balboa Ins. Co. v. Trans Global Equities, 267 Cal. Rptr. 787, 798 n.21 (Ct. App.
1990). "[Ain agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal .... " Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387-39). No California case
has expressly recognized such fiduciary duties for non-officer employees.
85. See Fowler v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 (Ct. App. 1987).
86. See Bancroft-Whitney, 411 P.2d at 936; Fowler, 539 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
87. The California Supreme Court has held that "salaries paid by a corporation to its employees are not matters of common knowledge.. ." and may not be revealed to a competitor to
facilitate the recruitment of the corporation's personnel. See Bancroft-Whitney, 411 P.2d at
939.

88. See id. at 924, 927.
89. See id. at 928.
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Bancroft-Whitney to delay giving raises to its employees so that Bender
could offer these employees higher salaries." Ultimately, Glen managed
to recruit 13 employees to leave Bancroft-Whitney simultaneously and
accept employment with Bender. 9 The California Supreme Court held
that Glen had breached his fiduciary duty to Bancroft-Whitney because he
used his position as the president, and information to which he was privy
due to his position, to facilitate the solicitation of Bancroft-Whitney's
employees.' Moreover, the court found Bender guilty of unfair competition because it participated in and reaped the benefit of Glen's action. 3
Accordingly, helping one's prospective employer to exploit one's current
employer can constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.
Although a non-officer employee may be held to a lesser fiduciary
standard, he still owes his prior employer a fiduciary duty.' Participating in one employer's operation while still employed by another employer
constitutes a wrongful transfer of loyalty.' In Fowler v. Varian, the
court held that the departing manager breached his duty of loyalty because he discussed the possibility of joining a new company with the new
company's founders; offered ideas and suggestions about the new company's business; discussed the capital structure of the new company; discussed the new company's product, which would compete directly with
his current employer's product; attended meetings with investors and assured them that he would join the new company; and when confronted by
the employer, would not reveal his association with the new company.96
The court seemed to be concerned with the departing employee's heavy
participation in his prospective employer's business as well as his deception of his current employer.' Accordingly, under Fowler, it is a breach
of fiduciary duty for employees to participate in their new employers' operations and for officer-employees to help their new employers recruit
their current co-workers before they resign from their current employment.

90. See id. at 936-41.
91. See id. at 926-33.
92. Id. at 936-37.
93. See id. at 939-41.
94. See Balboa Ins. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 798 n.21 (suggesting that a fiduciary duty may
exist under the agency doctrine).
95. See Fowler v. Varian Assos., 241 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 (Ct. App. 1987).
96. See id. at 540-44.
97. See id. at 543-44.
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C. Trade Secret Misappropriation

8

As a result of technical advances and greater employment mobility,
trade secret misappropriation has grown more important in the employment arena. In the Silicon Valley, the importance of trade secret law is
magnified because intellectual properties are among the most valuable assets to Silicon Valley companies.' As competition becomes more heated
in the Silicon Valley, businesses have become more concerned with the
prospect of losing their intellectual properties via departing employees."tu
Thus, to maintain their competitive edge, Silicon Valley firms have increasingly resorted to the legal protection of their intellectual properties
under trade secret law.101 Despite its proliferation, the trade secret misappropriation claim remains burdensome for a plaintiff to establish. Even
if plaintiff has shown that the alleged misappropriated information qualifies as a trade secret," ° plaintiff has only won half the battle. To successfully establish a trade secret claim, plaintiff must also prove that the
information: (1) derives independent economic value from not being generally known; (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy; and that (3) the employee used
improper means to misappropriate the trade secrets.'
In the employment arena, trade secret law prohibits employees from
disclosing or using the trade secrets learned during their employment. 5
Where an employee changes jobs, the new employer may be liable to the
prior employer if it knows or has reason to know that the new employee
is using or disclosing his prior employer's trade secrets and stands to

98. The California Civil Code defines "trade secret" as:
[1Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that:
(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use; and
(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West Supp. 1997).
While this Note offers some guidelines regarding the types of information not qualified as
trade secrets, it does not offer an analysis of the statutory language defining trade secrets.
Thus, whether the information derives independent economic value and is guarded as a secret is
beyond the scope of this Note.
99. See DiFronzo, supra note 30.
100. See id.
101. See id.

102. See § 3426.1(d).
103.
104.
105.

See § 3426.1.
See id.
See § 3426 (prohibiting misappropriation of trade secrets).
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benefit from such use or disclosure." 6 The courts impose a duty on the
employer to inquire into the employee's conduct to determine whether the
employee is using his prior employer's trade secrets incertain circumstances.
(1) Duty to inquire
An employer has a duty to inquire once it acquires constructive or
actual knowledge that its new employee is using trade secrets of the previous employer."t An employer has "constructive notice," under the
California Civil Code, when the employer has "actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular
fact, [which] constitutes constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases
in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, one might have learned such
fact.". 8 After an honest inquiry to determine if the new employee is in a
position to disclose the former employer's trade secrets, an employer
may reasonably rely upon the result of his investigation." Whether reliance is reasonable depends on the employer's experience, intelligence,
and business environment."1
Ralph Andrews Productions, Inc. v. ParamountPictures Corp. offersa valuable analysis of the scope of an employer's duty to inquire."'
The plaintiffs in that case, Ralph Andrews Productions, Inc. ("RAP")
and Ralph Andrews, were established producers of television game
shows.' Bernstein, a vice president of RAP, was in charge of developing new concepts for television shows."' After RAP had developed a
game show titled "Anything For Money," Andrews suggested that Bernstein present the idea of this game show to Paramount. 14 Rather than
presenting the idea on behalf of RAP, Bernstein told Paramount that he
had ownership rights to the show. 5 Paramount then hired Bernstein to

106. See § 3426.1(b)(2); Ungar Elec. Tools, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr.
268, 271 (Ct. App. 1961) (disapproved on another point, Nichols v. Hast, 400 P.2d 753 (Cal.
1965)) (enjoining defendants from manufacturing heating units by utilizing plaintiff's trade secrets misappropriated by plaintiffs former employee now working for defendant).
107. Ralph Andrews Prods., Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 271 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800
(Ct. App. 1990).
108. CAL. CIV. CODE § 19 (West 1982).
109. See Ralph Andrews Prods., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
110. See id. at 801-802; Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 192 P.2d 935, 937-38 (Cal. 1948)
(plaintiffs reliance on defendant's misrepresentation was reasonable because plaintiff was not a
vineyardist and knew nothing about growing grapes).

111. See 271 Cal. Rptr. at 799-802.
112.
113.

See id. at 798.
See id. at 797-98.

114. See id. at 798.
115.

See id.
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produce the show, knowing that Bernstein had worked for RAP."1 6 The
court held Paramount liable for trade secret misappropriation because it
had constructive notice that the game show belonged to RAP rather than
to Bernstein."1 7 The court noted that although Paramount asked Bernstein
for a letter verifying the ownership of the right, Paramount failed to follow up with this request when Bernstein did not produce the verification. " 8 The court believed that further inquiry by Paramount would have
revealed that the concept belonged to RAP."1 9 The court held that Paramount was not entitled to rely on Bernstein's misrepresentation because
the Paramount representative who dealt with Bernstein was an experienced and sophisticated executive in this type of business transaction.12
Thus, as Ralph Andrews Productions reveals, employers have a duty to
monitor their new employees to ensure that the employees are not using
trade secrets of their prior employer.
(2) Generalconcepts
12 1
Because not all proprietary information qualifies as a trade secret,
an employer should preliminarily evaluate the information the new employee brings to his new job to identify unprotectable information so that
the employer may immediately take advantage of its competitor's unprotectable information. For instance, the Ninth Circuit has declared that
ultimate goals and general concepts do not constitute trade secrets. General concepts cannot be claimed as an employer's trade secrets because
they.are "general... principles in the public domain and part of the intellectual equipment of technical employees. " 2 In Winston Research
Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. after the research phase for a
new precision tape producer, Johnson left Mincom's employment.2
Fourteen months later, at his new employment, Johnson completed a machine having the same desirable characteristics as the Mincom machine.' 24 The court held that the general approach to the technical concept in question did not qualify as a trade secret because it "was dictated
by well-known principles of physics. "" However, the device's specifications of the basic mechanical elements and their relationship to each

116. See id. at 799.
117. See id. at 799-802.
118. See id. at 799.
119. See id. at 800-01.
120. See id. at 801-02.
121. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West Supp. 1997).
122. See Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 139
(9th Cir. 1965).
123. See id. at 137.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 139.
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other were trade secrets because they were not publicly known, and Mincorn discovered these concepts after painstaking research and extensive
trial and error. 2 6

Thus, concepts consisting of general principles such as programming
principles do not qualify as trade secrets.' 27
(3) Knowledge, skills and expertise

Similarly, courts generally refuse to extend trade secret protection to
the knowledge, skills and expertise of an employee."2 The leading California case on this topic is Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic

Network. 129 The defecting employees in this case were initially reporters

and producers for Metro Traffic Control, a company that contracted with

radio stations to gather and broadcast local traffic information.'" When
the radio station KFWB, an important customer of Metro, did not renew
its contract, the employees left Metro and went to work for Shadow Traffic Network."' Metro sued Shadow for trade secret misappropriation,
alleging that the employees' qualities, sound, and personalities, as well as
their knowledge of the likes, fancies and characteristics of KFWB, were
Metro's trade secrets. 32 The court disagreed and held the employees
only took their knowledge and talents, which they could use as they

pleased.13

Accordingly, Metro Traffic Control reveals that an em-

ployee's talent, knowledge,134 skills and experience are not trade secrets
employer.

belonging to his

Similarly, expertise developed by applying one's knowledge and in-

telligence is not a trade secret.'

Although an employee may have begun

126. See id.
127. See id.; see also SCM v. Union Camp Corp., 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 140, 144 (D. Fla.
1970) (holding that defendant's use of plaintiff's five-step process to produce myrcene did not
constitute misappropriation of trade secrets because the process was well known in the industry,
and defendant's method of practicing the five well-known steps at his new company was substantially different from that of plaintiff).
128. See Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573,
578-79 (Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that "a stable of trained and talented at-will employees does
not constitute an employer's trade secret").
129. 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573 (Ct. App. 1994).
130. Id. at 574-75.
131. Id. at 577
132. Id. at 578-79.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See e.g., King v. Pacific Vitamin Corp., 64 Cal. Rptr. 486, 489 (Ct. App. 1967)
(stating that enhancements in an employee's general knowledge and experience are not trade
secrets no matter how extensive); Vekamaf Holland B.V. v. Pipe Benders, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 955, 984 (D. Minn. 1981), aft'd, 696 F.2d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 1982) (explaining that
.experience was not a trade secret").
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as an inexperienced worker, the knowledge and skills he gains by working and training in his employer's business belong to him. 3 6 Confidential

information of an employer loses protection after it has been merged into
the employee's "own faculties, skill and experience."' 37 Thus, a junior

engineer trained at the expense of his employer and who, after having acquired valuable general knowledge of the trade, leaves the employer and

goes to work for a competitor, commits no wrong.'

Accordingly, most

jurisdictions have determined that an employee is free to draw upon his

general knowledge,
experience, memory and skills upon termination of
39
employment. 1
(4) Inevitable disclosure theory
Although the majority of courts do not view employees' knowledge,
experience and skills as the employers' trade secrets, a minority of courts
outside California, and outside the Ninth Circuit, have held that, under

certain circumstances, information that has been merged into the employee's "own faculties, skills and experience" can be deemed a trade secret. ' ° This minority rule is based on the "inevitable disclosure" the136. Ridley v. Krout, 180 P.2d 124, 130 (Wyo. 1947) (explaining that knowledge acquired
by an employee in his employer's shop where the employee performed lock work of all sorts,
including key making, opening of safes, and changing lock combinations, did not constitute
trade secrets of his employer); Welex Jet Services, Inc. v. Owen, 325 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1959) (stating that employees need not forgo the exercise of their inventive powers
even when inspired by knowledge and experience gained during previous employment).
137. Aronson v. Orlov, 116 N.E. 951, 953 (Mass. 1917).
138. See Official Aviation Guide Co., Inc. v. American Aviation Assocs., 150 F.2d 173,
178 (7th Cir. 1945) (holding that an employer cannot prevent its employee from using skill and
intelligence acquired through the course of employment even if the employee uses the skills and
intelligence for the benefit of the employer's rival); Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 160 N.E.
804, 806 (Mass. 1928) (explaining that a previous employer cannot contractually prevent an
employee from using skill and intelligence acquired or increased during employment).
139. See e.g., GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 771 (S.D. Ohio 1969) (holding
that defendants "had every right" to utilize their general knowledge and experience upon termination of their employment"). An employee often gains information during an earlier job
which enables the employee to succeed in subsequent employment. Thus, courts cannot compel
employees who change employment to "wipe clean the slate of their memories." Moss, Adams
& Co. v. Shilling, 224 Cal. Rptr. 456, 458-59 (Ct. App. 1986); Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary
Corp., 23 Cal. Rptr. 198, 210 (Ct. App. 1962).
In practice, however, the trade secret jurisprudence falls to provide a guideline for employers and employees to distinguish meaningfully between an employee's education, skill and
experience, and the employer's protectable trade secrets. See Spanner, supra note 43, at 47
(characterizing this area of litigation as a "roll of the dice"). As a result, the issue of whether
certain information constitutes an employee's knowledge and skill-or an employer's protectable trade secrets-seems to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
140. See e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271 (7th Cir. 1995) (relying on
the "inevitable disclosure" doctrine and enjoining a marketing executive from performing a
similar function for a competitor); Carborundum Co. v. Williams, 468 F. Supp. 38, 41-42
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ory.14' The premise of this theory is that there are rare circumstances
where it would be impossible for a key employee to accept a particular
position with a competitor and faithfully perform his or her new duties
without necessarily calling upon trade secrets learned by virtue of the
prior employment. 42
Silicon Valley employers who have lost employees to rival firms
have advanced the inevitable disclosure theory in the California courts. 43
Indeed, the Superior Court of Santa Clara County in Advanced Micro
Devices v. Hyundai Electronics America,' is expected to determine
whether the inevitable disclosure theory conforms to California law.
Therefore, it is important for prospective employers to recognize and understand this potential liability if the California courts choose to adopt the
inevitable disclosure theory.
The modem seminal case of the inevitable disclosure theory is the
Seventh Circuit case of PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond. 45 In PepsiCo,
Redmond, the general manager of the California operations of PepsiCo,
accepted an offer to become a vice president of the beverage division of
Quaker Oats Company.146 Due to his position at PepsiCo, Redmond had
an intimate knowledge of PepsiCo's strategic marketing information for
its "All Sport" sports drink.147 One of Redmond's first responsibilities at
Quaker Oats Company was to integrate the distribution of Quaker's48
"Gatorade" sports drink with its "Snapple" beverage product line.1
PepsiCo sued Redmond and Quaker to enjoin Redmond from assuming
his duties at Quaker and to prevent him from using PepsiCo's marketing
information for "All Sports." 49 The court of appeals upheld the order
(E.D. Tenn. 1978), aff'd, 590 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1978) (mem.) (relying on the "inevitable disclosure" doctrine and granting preliminary injunction forbidding former employee from divulging to his new employer any information learned while working for plaintiff); Weed Eater,
Inc. v. Dowling, 562 S.W.2d 898, 902 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (relying on the "inevitable disclosure" doctrine, upholding one-year injunction against employee thereby preventing him from
working for Plaintiff's competitor); Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel, 385 N.E.2d 1055, 1059-60 (N.Y.
1978) (relying on the "inevitable disclosure" doctrine and reversing a summary dismissal of
complaint against the employee because disclosure of the former employer's trade secrets by the
employee was highly probable).
141. PepsiCo, Inc. 54 F.3d at 1268-69.
142. Such information is often so ingrained in the employee's memory that it cannot be unlearned or ignored by even the most ethical employee engaged in directly competitive employment.
143. See Luan v. Superior Ct., No. S053879 (S.J. App. 1996) (leaving in place a preliminary injunction, thus precluding five engineers from assuming new positions); Cataldo, supra
note 29 (reporting the status of Advance Micro Devices v. Hyundai ElectronicsAmerica).
144. Cataldo, supra note 29.
145. 54 F.3d 1262.
146. Id. at 1264.
147. Id. at 1265-66.
148. Id. at 1266.
149. Id. at 1265.
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that enjoined Redmond from assuming his new position at Quaker for six
months. 150 The court reasoned that Redmond, in his new position at
Quaker, would not be able to refrain from relying on PepsiCo's trade secrets as he planned the new distribution strategy for Gatorade and Snappie. The court explained:
PepsiCo finds itself in the position of a coach, one of whose players has
left, playbook in hand, to join the opposing team before the big game.
Quaker and Redmond's protestation that their distribution systems and
plans 5are entirely different from [PepsiCo's ] are thus not really responsive.' '
However, PepsiCo and the inevitable disclosure theory are problematic. In granting the injunction, the district court in PepsiCo had relied
on IBM Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., a case that was later vacated on
remand.'
Moreover, the inevitable disclosure doctrine is actually a dis53
guised non-competition covenant, which is unenforceable in California.1
First, in preventing an employee from assuming a position with another
employer which will require the employee, intentionally or otherwise, to
call upon his or her previously acquired knowledge, this doctrine prohibits a former employee not only from disclosing secrets but also from taking certain jobs.'54 Indeed, in FMC Corp., a district court in North
Carolina recently rejected the inevitable disclosure theory because such a
law would effectively make the employee an "indentured servant" of his
prior employer.5 Prohibiting an employee from accepting comparable
employment is beyond the scope of trade secret law.
Furthermore, California law only prohibits misappropriation of trade
secrets and does not prohibit accepting similar responsibilities with a new
employee.' 5 6 Unlike other states, California specifically prohibits covenants not to compete.' 57 Thus, an employee is free to accept an identical
job with a competitor. Furthermore, California requires a plaintiff in a
trade secret misappropriation suit to identify the information allegedly
stolen. 51 Consequently, the court may enjoin an employee from disclosing identified items, instead of enjoining the employee from taking the
job to prevent trade secret misappropriation.
150. Id. at 1272.
151. Id. at 1270.
152. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20406, *1, *7 (D. Minn. 1991), vacated Seagate Tech., Inc.
v. IBM Corp., 962 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1992).
153. James A. DiBoise & David J. Berger, COMPETING VIEWS REGARDING THE
INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE OF TRADE SECRETS, NEW MATrER,

Spring 1996, at 44.

154. Id.
155. FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1482 (W.D. N.C.

1995).
156. DiBoise & Berger, supra note 153,at 44.
157. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997).
158. See CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE § 2019(d) (West 1997).
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The inevitable disclosure doctrine, therefore, seems inconsistent
with California law because it authorizes enjoining the employee from as-

suming the job for which he was hired. Given California's strong public
policy in protecting competition, it is unlikely that the California courts
will adopt the inevitable disclosure theory. Nevertheless, companies that
hire employees from a direct competitor, and then assign them to a proj-

ect that is identical to one that they worked on for their prior employer,
should be aware of the potential liability if the California courts choose to

adopt the inevitable disclosure theory.
(5) Breach Of Employment Contract
In addition to breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of trade

secrets, an employee's breach of employment contract with his prior employer can also implicate his new employer.1 9 A typical employment
contract may contain four types of restrictions: (1) a restriction against
soliciting other employees ("non-solicitation"); (2) a restriction against
disclosing proprietary information ("non-disclosure"); (3) a restriction
against competing with the employer ("non-competition"); and (4) a restriction against using an invention conceived during employment ("invention assignment").
A non-solicitation provision precludes an employee from soliciting
the departure of her co-workers when she leaves to join another company.
A California court upheld such a provision in an employee's
termination agreement that restrained the employee from "disrupting,

damaging, impairing or interfering" with his former employer by "raiding" its work-staff after termination.'
In Loral, the defendant Moyes
resigned from his position as the president of a subsidiary of Loral and
accepted an offer from a competitor, Aydin."6 Moyes' termination was
159. No California court has addressed whether a company has a duty to inquire whether
the employee is under a valid contractual relationship with his prior employer, or to monitor the
employee's activities for wrongful conduct. However, common sense dictates that without a
duty to inquire, employers will deliberately choose to remain ignorant and to claim an innocent
lack of knowledge in the event of a lawsuit. Furthermore, under trade secrets law, the courts
impose a duty on the employer to inquire into the employee's conduct if the employer has constructive notice that the employee may be misappropriating his employer's trade secrets. Ralph
Andrews Prods., Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 271 Cal. Rptr. 797, 799-800 (Ct. App.
1990). Given the overlap between trade secrets law and contract law in the employment context, the courts will most likely follow the trade secrets rule and will impose a duty of reasonable inquiry. Accordingly, it is a good practice for the employer to review the new hiree's previous employment and other agreements with the prior employer to determine the restrictions
imposed on the employee's future conduct.
160. See Loral Corp., 219 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (explaining the nature of non-solicitation
clauses).
161. Id. at 839-40.
162. Id.
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accompanied by an agreement under which he agreed not to "raid" Loral's employees. 163 Once at Aydin, however, Moyes recruited a large
number of employees from Loral.'6
Although the court held that the non-solicitation agreement was enforceable, it construed the agreement narrowly as prohibiting only affirmative solicitation of employees by a former employee.'6 The court
reasoned that the agreement did not significantly restrain trade or business because employees were still free to seek employment with the competitor; they only lost the option of being contacted by the departed employee.' 6 Thus, the Loral court seemed to draw the line between
protected and unprotected competition on a factual question-who calls
whom first regarding the job opportunity.
Accordingly, if the employee had signed a non-solicitation agreement with the prior employer, the new company should require the employee to refrain from actively recruiting his former employer's personnel until the contract expires. Nevertheless, according to the Loral court,
the company is free to talk to those employees who approach the company on their own initiative. It may be a sound practice for the company
to have any job-seekers sign a declaration stating that they were not enlisted by the departed employees, and that they themselves initiated the
contact.
Non-disclosure provisions, on the other hand, prohibit employees
from disclosing proprietary information to outsiders, including, but not
limited to, trade secrets. 67 Non-disclosure agreements, however, do not,
in practice, extend the scope of protection beyond trade secrets. They68
only protect what is already protected under existing trade secret law.1
Thus, if the new employee signed a non-disclosure agreement with his
prior employer, the hiring employer should only be concerned about disclosure of trade secrets.
The most restrictive contractual provision is the non-competition
agreement. A non-competition agreement prohibits an employee from
competing with his former employer or imposes penalties for such unauthorized competition.169 Non-competition agreements are unenforceable
in California unless drafted narrowly to protect trade secrets or other

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 279-80.
166. Id. at 279.
167. See, e.g., Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d
573, 577 (Ct. App. 1994).
168. Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling, 224 Cal. Rptr. 456, 459 (Ct. App. 1986).
169. See Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal. 1965).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

protectable confidential information. 70 Non-competition agreements in-

clude all contracts designed to penalize the employee for accepting employment with a competitor.' 7 1 In Chamberlain v. Augustine, the Court
declared invalid an agreement requiring the employee to pay liquidated
damages of $5,000 if the employee worked for a competitor.'
The
Court reasoned that because of the liability, the employee was "not as
free" to choose employers as he would have been without the agreement. 173 Accordingly, non-competition agreements are unenforceable in
California because they restrain the employee's freedom in choosing employment.
In addition to the above agreements, technical employees are routinely required to sign an invention assignment agreement. This type of
agreement requires the employee to disclose and assign any contributions
and inventions relating to the employer's business conceived or made
during the employment period to the employer. 74 Such contractual assignments of inventions are subject to certain statutory restrictions." 5
Notwithstanding this restriction, invention assignment agreements expand
the employer's proprietary rights beyond what is afforded under existing

170. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 ("[e]very contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind is to that extent
void."); Muggill, 398 P.2d at 149 (invalidating the provision that forfeited plaintiff's pension
rights if he worked for a competitor).
171. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600.
172. 172 Cal. 285, 288-89 (1916).
173. Id.
174. A typical invention assignment agreement reads as follows:
This agreement concerns contributions and inventions conceived or made by me,
alone or with others
A. while I am employed by the company whether or not during working hours
and
B. that relate to the business of the company or to any reasonable expansion of
such business, or result from my work for the company.
I agree:
1. To disclose them promptly in writing to the company.
2. That all such contributions and inventions are to become the property of the
company whether or not patent applications are filed thereon.
The California Labor Code section 2870(a) prohibits an employer from requiring an employee
to assign rights to inventions that are unrelated to employment. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2870(a)
(West 1989 & Supp. 1997). Thus, an employer cannot require an employee to assign any of the
employee's rights in an invention that the employee develops entirely on his own time, without
using the employer's equipment, supplies, facilities, or trade secret information. Id.
175. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2870 (requiring a prior employer looking to claim ownership of an
invention under an assignment contract to establish that the invention relates to the employer's
business or demonstrable anticipated research or development, or results from any work performed by the employee for the employer).
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patent and trade secret laws. 7 6 Thus, departing technical employees and

hiring employers must pay additional attention to the restrictions imposed
by these assignment agreements, because even inventions that were
merely conceived during prior employment could belong to that former
employer.
Like all contracts, an invention assignment agreement must be supported by consideration. 1" Condition of employment is one common way
to satisfy this consideration requirement.

78

Thus, an invention assign-

ment agreement is enforceable if signed on the first day of employment.

79

However, if signed during mid-employment, the provision must

be supported by new consideration. 18
Many agreements also include a "trailer clause," requiring the employee to assign any invention he creates during a period following the
termination of the employment relationship. Most courts limit the scope

of trailer clauses to cover only trade secrets and other protectable proprietary information."' Some courts, however, have extended the cover176. See American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Integrated Network Corp., 972 F.2d 1321, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
177. See Voith Hydro, Inc. v. Hydro West Group, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3817 at
*14 (N.D. Cal. 1997); American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Wise, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9950 at
*6 (E.D. Vir. 1989); cf. National Homes Corp. v. Lester Indus., Inc., 404 F.2d 225, 227 (4th
Cir. 1968) (inferring consideration is a requisite for validity and enforcement of a restrictive
covenant).
178. See Nat'l Risk Management, Inc. v. Bramwell, 819 F. Supp. 417, 429 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (stating that employment itself is a valid consideration for restrictive covenants entailed in
an employment agreement entered into on the first day of work); Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 185
Cal. App. 3d 438, 448 (1986).
179. See Nat'l Risk Management, Inc., 819 F. Supp. at 429.
180. Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1339 (9th Cir.
1980) (explaining that when a restrictive covenant is made after employment has started, the
court requires a change in employment status to serve as consideration); Schlumberger Well
Services v. Blaker, 623 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (holding that payment of
$98,750 upon termination was not sufficient as consideration for enforcement of a covenant not
to compete); Gagliardi Bros., Inc. v. Caputo, 538 F. Supp. 525, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (stating
that covenant not to compete was unenforceable for lack of consideration when the employee
received no benefit); Perthou v. Stewart, 243 F. Supp. 655, 658-59 (D. Or. 1965) (finding that
covenant made seven days after the commencement of work was not supported by consideration). But see Modem Controls, Inc. v. Andreakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir. 1978)
(finding that consideration was provided by Modem Control's obligation to pay Andreakis' base
pay for two years if he could not find suitable work in another field); Olin Water Servs. v.
Midland Research Lab., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 412, 415 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (finding that continued
employment was sufficient consideration to support covenant not to compete); Barnes Group v.
Andrealds, 591 F. Supp. 454, 461 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (holding that a promise to pay employee
two years worth of wages if employee could not find suitable work in another field was adequate consideration).
181. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 893 (N.J. 1988); Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg., 350 F.2d 134, 138 (9th Cir. 1965) (stating that
there is no "judicial recognition of a legally protectible [sic] interest in the secrecy of industrial
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age of the trailer clause to "highly specialized, current information not
generally known in the industry, created and stimulated by the research
environment furnished by the employer, to which the employee has been
'exposed' and 'enriched' solely due to his employment. "182
Even if an invention assignment agreement is valid, a prior employer
seeking to claim ownership of an invention under the assignment contract
must establish that the invention: (1) relates to the employer's business or
the employer's actual or demonstrable anticipated research or development, or results from any work performed by the employee for the employer,"8 3 and (2) was conceived during the employment period.1 14 Although California courts have not addressed the second issue, federal
jurisprudence provides some useful guidelines for determining when conception occurs. Under federal law, conception is the time when the idea
crystallizes in the employee's mind. 85 Although patent law provides that
conception occurs when the inventor has a "specific, settled idea, [or] a
particular solution to the problem at hand" which can be described with
particularity,
under contract law, "conception" takes on a broader mean86
ing.1

Because it is impossible to tell when an idea crystallizes in an employee's mind, the courts have used circumstantial evidence such as the
level of difficulty of conceiving the idea, the length of employment, and
the length of time between the termination of employment and the subsequent conception to determine when conception occurred."8 7 In Syntex
Ophthalmics, Inc., the defendant, while employed by the plaintiff, developed new monomers that would yield an oxygen-permeable contact lens
material.' 8 Four days after resigning from his job, the defendant prepared a patent disclosure statement which revealed the discovery of additional novel siloxane monomers for use in making gas permeable lens
material.' 89 Despite the defendant's claim that this new discovery was
prompted by his having reviewed an article on silicone chemistry sometime after leaving Syntex, the court held that the defendant conceived the

information as such"); Marc B. Hershovitz, Unhitching The Trailer Clause: The Rights of Inventive Employees and Their Employers, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 187, 202 (1995).
182. Ingersoll-Rand,542 A.2d at 894.
183. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2870 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997).
184. See supra note 174 (typical invention assignment agreement).
185. Gunter v. Stream, 573 F.2d 77, 80 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
186. See American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Integrated Network Corp., 972 F.2d 1321, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
187. See Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 214 U.S.P.Q. 272, 279 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
General Signal Corp., Inc. v. Primary Flow Signal, Inc., 1987 WL 147798, *1, *4 (D. R.I.
1987).
188. Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc., 214 U.S.P.Q. at273.
189. Id. at 275.
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new invention while employed by the plaintiff. 1" Perhaps the court was
convinced by the fact that the defendant copied, almost verbatim, 100
pages of process sheets which he had used while employed at Syntex to
prepare his new patent application."'
Similarly, in General Signal Corp., the defendant worked for the
plaintiff for 22 years, advancing from the position of draftsman to that of
Products Development Manager. 1" The defendant signed a contract
agreeing to assign to the plaintiff all inventions and ideas, patentable or
not, made or conceived by the defendant, while employed by the plaintiff
and for six months thereafter (the "trailer clause"). 1" The defendant
subsequently left the plaintiffs employ. Five days after the invention assignment agreement expired, the defendant recorded the conception of a
universal flow meter which he later patented. 1" The court granted the
plaintiff equitable assignment of the universal flow meter patent because
the idea was conceived during the defendant's employment period.1 95
The court reasoned:
The perfection of a flow meter proved to be a painstakingly intricate
process involving extensive testing. It is therefore difficult to believe
that after a long and distinguished career with Plaintiff, [Defendant] in
his musing five days after the trailer clause expired for the first time
came up with the idea for the [invention]. Although the word
"Eureka!" has allegedly been uttered by more than one inventor over
the years, the concept at issue does not lend itself to such sudden discovery. The Court finds that the concept of the [patent at issue] must
have existed in [Defendant's] mind before his employment with [Plaintiff] ended.... [Furthermore,] [tihe essential physical difference between the [previous] patent and the [patent at issue] is that the internal
edges of the valve of the [previous] patent are sharp whereas the edges
of the valve of the [patent at issue] are rounded. It is difficult to believe, and the Court does not believe, that [Defendant] did not conceive
of a flow meter
so similar to the [previous flow meter] until after he left
196
[Plaintiff].
Thus, whether an invention was conceived during the employment
period is a fact-intensive inquiry and guided in many ways by common
sense. Typically, the more complex the invention, and the shorter the
period between employment termination and the announcement of the in-

190. Id. at 279.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 275.
GeneralSignal Corp., 1987 WL 147798 at *1.
Id. at *1-'2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *4.
Id.

1006

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

vention, the more likely it is that the court will find that the invention was
conceived before the employee started his new job."9
In California, a strong policy interest in open competition"'8 has
curtailed the employer's ability to contractually restrain employees from
pursuing comparable employment. So long as the hiring employer does
not condone or participate in the new employee's breach of fiduciary duty
or breach of contract, or misappropriation of trade secrets, it will not incur liability. Moreover, the California courts have struck down noncompetition agreements and severely limited the scope of protection of
non-disclosure agreements." 9 In furthering the pro-competition policy,
the California courts would probably follow the federal courts and scrutinize an employer's ownership claim of an invention pursuant to an invention assignment agreement because this type of agreement expands the
employer's proprietary right beyond what is afforded under patent and
trade secret law.' Accordingly, an employer considering hiring away its
competitor's employees faces very few restrictions in California.
H. Application of Potential Causes of Action
To illustrate the impact of California law on the hiring practices of
companies in the Silicon Valley, this part of the Note applies the foregoing legal rules to situations typically faced by hiring employers in the
Silicon Valley. It will analyze the potential liability of the hiring employer
and the departed employees.
A.

Hypothetical

Due to recent expansion, Alpha company needs an additional software vice president to manage its new division. Alpha advertises the position in the newspapers, trade journals, and on the internet. Alpha also
lists the job opening with recruiting firms. After a few weeks, the recruiting firms present to Alpha several qualified candidates who are currently employed at various companies. Alpha eventually makes an offer
to Vince Peters, a vice president of Beta, Alpha's direct competitor. Alpha entices Peters by offering him a thirty percent increase in salary and
stock options. To Alpha's delight, Peters accepts the position.

197. See generally, id.; Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 214 U.S.P.Q. 272, 279
(N.D. Ill. 1982).
198. See Howard v. Babcock, 6 Cal. 4th 409, 416 (1993) (explaining that a person has a
substantial interest in the unrestrained pursuit of his or her livelihood and must be allowed to
change employers and compete for available business and customers).
199. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.

July 1997]

TO MIE OR NOT TO HIRE

Prior to his departure from Beta, Peters tells his closest engineers
that he is leaving to join Alpha because Alpha has the most amazing stateof-the-art projects and is very profitable. Shortly after Peters' arrival at
Alpha, Carl Evans, one of the chief engineers who worked under Peters
at Beta, faxes his resume to Alpha. Peters recommends that Evans is a
"must hire" and vouches that Evans is the best engineer Peters has ever
met. Although Alpha does not have an engineering opening, it invites
Evans in for an interview. Evans shines during the interview. Impressed
with Evans' performance and track record, Alpha creates a position for,
and makes an offer to, Evans. To increase its chance of success in hiring
Evans, Alpha invites Evans to attend some of its technical meetings to
give Evans a chance to observe the workplace dynamics between Alpha's
technical employees. Alpha's efforts pay off, and Evans accepts the position.
Evans turns out to be even better than Alpha has anticipated. Only
six months after joining Alpha, Evans perfects a revolutionary idea that
will significantly increase Alpha's product performance.
Alpha's rosy future is not without obstacles, however. Beta files
suits against Alpha, as well as Peters and Evans. Beta seeks damages
and equitable relief to enjoin Peters from performing as the vice president, and Alpha from implementing the revolutionary idea perfected by
Evans. Facing these lawsuits, Alpha finds out that both Peters and Evans
had signed employment contracts with Beta, agreeing not to (1) use or
disclose Beta's proprietary information; (2) compete with Beta for six
months following employment termination; and (3) to recruit other Beta
employees for six months following employment termination. They also
agreed to assign to Beta all inventions made by them while employed and
six months following termination.
B. Analysis
(1) Unfair Competition

The first step in analyzing Alpha's potential liability is to determine
whether Alpha has engaged in predatory hiring, a common unfair competition claim. Alpha's liability under the predatory hiring claim depends
on whether Alpha's sole purpose for hiring Peters and Evans was to destroy Beta's business. 1 Alpha hired Peters to manage a new division of
its business due to recent expansion. Although Alpha hired Evans when
it did not have an opening, it created a position where Evans proved to be
most productive. Indeed, Evans conducted a research and development
201. See supra notes 62-82 and accompanying text (analyzing the sole purpose requirement).
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project which resulted in a revolutionary idea. Accordingly, Alpha's
main purpose in hiring Peters and Evans seems to be the utilization of
their expertise, not the destruction of Beta. In fact, there is no evidence
that Alpha sought to destroy Beta, unlike the "we wound UAI again"
memo in UniversalAnalytics. m
Furthermore, putting the new employees to use is evidence of nonpredatory hiring. 3 Once on board, Peters assumed the vice presidential
responsibilities and Evans assumed the engineering responsibilities.
Thus, Alpha did not hire Peters away just to drive Beta out of business.
Accordingly, any injury Beta suffered from losing Peters was purely incidental, and thus, insufficient to establish that Alpha had a predatory intent.

The court, however, may infer a predatory intent from circumstantial evidence such as targeted recruiting efforts or an unreasonably high
employment compensation offer.' Alpha advertised the vice president
position in the newspapers, trade journals, and on the internet. Furthermore, Alpha listed the position with more than one employment agency
and, like the hiring employer in Universal Analytics, did not direct the
agencies to target Beta. In fact, the head-hunting agencies presented Alpha with vice presidential candidates from a variety of companies. This
evidence shows that Alpha's primary motivation was to find a vice president with appropriate experience and talent. Likewise, the hiring of Evans did not indicate that Alpha intended to injure Beta by raiding its employees. Since Alpha did not have an engineering position open, it did
not recruit Evans. Evans applied to Alpha on his own initiative. Accordingly, Alpha did not single Beta out by directing all recruiting efforts
at Beta.
In addition to targeted recruiting, significant monetary rewards disproportionate to the new employee's skills and experience are also evidence of predatory hiring.20 In this hypothetical, the courts would have
to consider whether a thirty percent salary increase for a high-tech executive such as Peters is commensurable with the skills and experience
Peters would bring to a new company. Given the intensive competition
for skilled technical employees in the Silicon Valley, a thirty percent increase in salary, albeit higher than the twenty percent increase in Univer-

202. Even with the memo, the court did not find the defendant liable because wounding the
plaintiff was not the defendant's sole purpose. See Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNealSchwendler Corp., 914 F.2d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1990).
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (analyzing circumstantial evidence of
predatory intent).
205. See Medtronic Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1467 (D. Minn.

1990).
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sal Analytics, 2°6 is well within the norm of offers made to technical personnel. 2°7 Accordingly, Alpha's attractive salary offer to Peters does not
help Beta in establishing its predatory hiring claim. Because it did not
appear that Alpha hired Peters and Evans solely to destroy Beta's business, Alpha is probably not liable for predatory hiring.
(2) Breach Of FiduciaryDuty
Next, the court should determine whether Peters and Evans breached
their respective fiduciary duties to Beta. Alpha may also be implicated in
wrongdoing if it condoned and benefited from Peters' or Evans' breach
of fiduciary duty toward Beta. It is a breach of fiduciary duty for an officer-employee to solicit the departure of other employees before resigning." Having been a vice president for Beta, Peters would be held to a
higher fiduciary standard than that of non-officer employees.' °9 Thus,
Peters' fiduciary duty to Beta precludes him from soliciting the departure
of other employees before leaving Beta. In this hypothetical it is questionable whether Peters solicited Evans' departure from Beta. Peters'
conversation with the engineers about Alpha's exciting projects and profitability is in no way similar to the active recruitment by the president of
Bancroft-Whitney. 10 Peters did not ask Evans to leave Beta and join Alpha. Peters, however, may have indirectly enticed Evans by telling him
about the positive aspects of Alpha. Thus, Peters arguably played a part
in Evans' decision to leave Beta. The court, however, draws the line of
liability on the basis of affirmative solicitation. 21' Because Evans initiated
the hiring process by faxing to Alpha an unsolicited resume, the court
probably would not hold Peters liable for breaching his fiduciary duty.
Although Evans would be held to a lesser standard because he was
not an officer-employee of Beta, he still owed Beta a duty of loyalty.
Participating in one employer's operation while still employed by another
employer constitutes a wrongful transfer of loyalty. 212 Whether Evans
breached his fiduciary duty when he went to Alpha's meetings before
leaving Beta depends on the degree of his participation in these meetings.
Alpha invited Evans to its technical meetings to observe the working relations between the members of Alpha's technical staff after it had ex206. The court found the twenty percent increase in salary commensurable with the employees' experience levels. Universal Analytics, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1259.
207. Interview with Do Bui, Regional Director of Vital Link Computing (a recruiting firm
based in the San Francisco Bay Area), at his office (Aug. 2, 1996).
208. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
209. Id.
210. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
212. See Fowler v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 196 Cal. App. 3d 34, 41 (1987).
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tended a job offer to Evans. Alpha used the invitation as a selling tool to
increase its chances of luring Evans. Evans, on the other hand, did not
need to impress Alpha at the meetings because he had received Alpha's
offer. Thus, the court would probably hold that Evans did not transfer
his loyalty from Beta to Alpha.
Because Peters and Evans did not transfer their loyalty to Alpha before their departure from Beta, they did not breach their fiduciary duties.
Peters did not affirmatively solicit Evans' departure, and Evans likely did
not contribute information at the meeting. Accordingly, Peters and Evans did not breach their fiduciary duty. Therefore, Alpha would not be
held liable for breach of fiduciary duty under California law.
(3) Trade Secret Misappropriation
At issue under the trade secret misappropriation claim is Evans'
revolutionary idea that he completed six months after joining Alpha. To
successfully claim ownership of this idea and to preclude Alpha from implementing it under trade secret law, Beta would be required to show that
the goals, as well as the means, of the idea were completed by Evans before he left Beta's employ.213 Moreover, Beta would have to establish
that the idea did not consist solely of general programming concepts.214
Here, the concepts that Evans brought with him to Alpha were not
trade secrets because they were not specific ideas accompanied by methods of implementation. Indeed, it took Evans six months after joining
Alpha to conceive and perfect the idea. To do this, Evans undoubtedly
used general programming methods and engineering principles that he
had learned at Beta. However, he is not liable for trade secret misappropriation because general methods and principles do not qualify as trade
secrets. Furthermore, the expertise, skills, and knowledge that Evans
gained as a result of his tenure at Beta are not trade secrets owned by
Beta. Thus, Peters and Evans were free to draw upon their general
knowledge, experience, memory, and skill to perform their duties in their
new positions at Alpha. Accordingly, Evans and Peters did not misappropriate Beta's trade secrets.
Although the above outcome would result under the majority rule
that knowledge and skills of an employee are not trade secrets of his em213. See Gabriel Co. v. Talley Indus., 137 U.S.P.Q. 630, 633 (D. Ariz. 1963) (offering
protection only for a "perfected product or process"); Packard Instrument Co. v. Reich, 412
App. 1980) (extending protection only to "particularized plans and procN.E.2d 617, 623 (Ill.
esses"); Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 105 Ili. App. 2d 261, 278 (1969) ("If Vendo has discovered the
means for achieving its goal, we might well have had a different view as to whether Vendo had
a trade secret."); Chomerics, Inc. v. Ehrreich, 421 N.E.2d 453, 459 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981).
214. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text (analyzing Winston Research Corp. and

SMC Corp).
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ployer, the minority rule of inevitable disclosure would yield a different
result. 215 The minority rule holds that an employee's knowledge is a
trade secret of his former employer if the employee cannot perform his
new job's duties without necessarily calling upon trade secrets learned
during his prior employment.216 Because Peters' and Evans' positions at
Alpha were similar to those held at Beta, they may be liable under this
minority view which has been embraced by a few courts outside California.
Similar to Redmond in PepsiCo., Peters and Evans came from Alpha's direct competitor to assume a comparable position. While serving
as Beta's software development vice president, Peters undoubtedly acquired knowledge of Beta's software development plans. Likewise, Evans undoubtedly gained technical knowledge while at Beta. Thus, under
the inevitable disclosure theory, it is conceivable that the court would
enjoin Peters and Evans from continuing their responsibilities at Alpha,
and Peters and Evans would probably be held liable for trade secret misappropriation.
Assuming that the inevitable disclosure theory applies, Alpha could
also be held liable for trade secret misappropriation. It is likely that Alpha knew, or had reason to know, that Peters and Evans used their
knowledge and experience derived from their employment at Beta. Because Alpha and Beta are direct competitors, any knowledge or experience that an employee has about one company's technology would be
highly relevant to the other company's business. Additionally, Peters and
Evans assumed positions that were similar to those they held at Beta;
thus, they inevitably would use their knowledge and experience gained
from working at Beta in their new jobs.
These facts are probably sufficient to impose a duty on Alpha to investigate whether Peters and Evans have violated trade secret laws. Because Alpha failed to halt Peters' and Evans' actions, it would also be
implicated in the trade secret misappropriation. However, the discussion
of the liability under the inevitable disclosure theory is academic because
the California courts would likely reject this theory.2 17
(4) Breach Of Employment Contract

Next, the court should determine whether Peters and Evans breached
their employment contracts with Beta, because such breaches could implicate Alpha in unfair competition. Peters and Evans signed (1) a noncompetition provision; (2) a non-disclosure provision; (3) a non215. See supranotes 140-58 (analyzing the inevitable disclosure theory).
216. See id.
217. However, one court has left in place a preliminary injunction under this theory. See
supra notes 140-58 and accompanying text.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

solicitation provision; and (4) an invention assignment provision. Because non-competition agreements are generally unenforceable under
California law, 2 8' Alpha, Peters, and Evans may safely dismiss this provision as being nothing more than a scarecrow.
In addition to the non-competition provision, Peters and Evans also
agreed not to use or disclose Beta's proprietary information. Nondisclosure agreements do not afford an employer protection beyond trade
secrets.2 19 Thus, the resolution of this breach of contract claim under the

non-disclosure provision depends on whether Peters and Evans have misappropriated Beta's trade secrets, as analyzed above. Accordingly, the
confidentiality provision should not cause Alpha, Peters, or Evans any
additional concern.
The non-solicitation provision, on the other hand, is more troublesome. It precludes an employee from soliciting his co-workers' departures for a defined period after the employee's termination or resignation.' It is questionable whether Peters solicited Evans' departure from
Beta. Although Peters did not ask Evans to leave Beta and join Alpha,
Peters may have enticed Evans indirectly by telling Evans that Alpha was
working on the most advanced state-of-the-art technology and was very
profitable. The Loral court, however, emphasized that only affirmative
solicitation is prohibited. 22 1 The court seemed to define the scope of liability based on who calls whom first about the employment opportunity.' Because Evans initiated the hiring process by faxing to Alpha an
unsolicited resume, the court probably would not hold Peters liable for
breaching the non-solicitation provision.
Lastly, the invention assignment provision may have serious implications for Alpha. If the court finds that the idea belongs to Beta under
the invention assignment contract, Alpha not only loses the opportunity to
commercialize the idea, but it also loses the idea to its direct competitor.
Thus, the court would need to determine whether this invention assignment provision is enforceable; and if enforceable, whether it covers the
idea. An invention assignment agreement is enforceable if the employment is conditioned on its execution.'
Beta, like most high-tech employers, probably has its new employees sign this agreement as part of
the job acceptance, or on the first day of employment. Assuming this is

218. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-02 (stating covenants not to compete are typically unenforceable).
219. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
221. See Loral Corp., 219 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
222. Id.
223. The condition of employment is one way to satisfy the contract consideration requirement. Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 185 Cal. App. 3d 438, 448 (1986).
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the procedure Beta used when it hired Evans, he is bound by the terms of
the invention assignment provision.
According to the terms of the employment contract, only inventions
relating to Beta's business that Evans conceived during the employment
period would have to be assigned to Beta. Because Alpha and Beta are
direct competitors, an invention benefiting Alpha would likely relate to
Beta's business. Thus, Beta could easily establish the first requirement of
the agreement. Although the first factor is met, Beta still must prove that
the idea was conceived while Evans was still in its employ. Unlike the
employees in Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. and General Signal Corp,' who
claimed to have conceived an invention approximately five days after the
expiration of the assignment agreement, it took Evans six months to perfect the idea. This can hardly be characterized as a "sudden flash of ingenuity." Also, given the fast pace of technological progress in the Silicon Valley, a six-month old idea probably would have become obsolete.
It is therefore highly improbable that the idea had "crystallized" in Evans' mind before he left Beta's employ. Consequently, the court would
likely rule that the idea was conceived after Evans joined Alpha, and find
that Evans did not breach the invention assignment agreement.
Evans' invention assignment provision also contains a trailer clause,
requiring him to assign inventions that he makes within six months of his
departure from Beta. Given California's pro-competition stance, the
California courts probably would follow the majority rule and limit the
scope of the trailer clause to protect only trade secrets. Thus, whether
Evans violated the trailer clause turns on whether Evans appropriated
Beta's trade secrets.
In this hypothetical, which presents a typical hiring scenario in the
Silicon Valley, the hiring employer and the new employees would not be
liable to the employees' prior employer.
M1. Best Practices
Below is a list of recommended practices that will help an employer
avoid liability.
A.

The Recruiting Stage:

1.DO advertise the position in appropriate publications. Evidence
that the company advertises the position and uses employment agencies
shows that the company's primary motivation is to find employees with

224. See supra notes 186-196 and accompanying text (discussing Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc.
and General Signal Corp.).
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appropriate experience and talent, and not to injure a particular competitor.
2.DO NOT target one company for recruits. Targeting the recruiting effort at one company may be circumstantial evidence of an intent to
"raid."
3.DO NOT direct employment agencies to recruit employees from
one particular competitor. Directing employment agencies to target one
competitor for recruits may be evidence of a conspiracy between the employer and the agencies to drive the competitor out of business by usurping its crucial employees.
4.DO NOT accept confidential information regarding the employee's
former co-workers (such as salaries) from the new employee. Revealing
such confidential information before terminating current employment is a
breach of fiduciary duty. If the company accepts such information, it
would be deemed to have participated in the employee's breach, and thus
would be guilty of unfair competition.
5.DO NOT encourage employees of a competitor to leave "enmasse." Mass termination of employment may be used as circumstantial
evidence showing a predatory intent.
6.DO NOT hire a competitor's employees to drive the competitor
out of business. Hiring one's competitor's employees solely to destroy
competition is forbidden.
7.DO NOT drive a competitor out of business in order to hire its
employees. Doing so may be deemed as unlawful, egregious conduct.
8.DO pursue colleagues of the new employee who, on their own
initiative, approach the company regarding employment opportunities.
Have them sign a declaration, stating that they initiated the contact with
the company and were not enlisted by their ex-co-worker. The company
is always free to hire potential employees who approach the company on
their own initiative.
B. The Offer / Acceptance Stage

1.DO NOT make offers that are disproportionately high in comparison with the employee's skills and experience. Such offers may be used
as circumstantial evidence of predatory intent.
2.DO include a provision in the offer letter that prohibits the employee from disclosing his prior employer's trade secrets and confidential
information. This provision should be signed concurrently with job acceptance. Such a provision would put the new employee on notice that
the hiring company does not condone such action. Moreover, if the employee does use his prior employer's trade secrets, the provision would
serve as evidence that the company did not participate in the employee's
wrongful conduct.
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3.DO review the employment contract between employee and
his/her prior employer. The company may have a duty to inquire into the
new employee's contractual obligations to his prior employer.
4.DO require the employee to refrain from actively recruiting his
former employer's personnel until the contract expires, if the employee
signed an agreement with the prior employer which contained a nonsolicitation provision. The company will be guilty of unfair competition
if it participates in, and benefits from, its new employee's breach of contract with his prior employer.
C. Employment Stage

1.DO put the new employees to work immediately after they are
hired. Non-use is circumstantial evidence of predatory intent.
2.DO prohibit new employees from taking any written or electronic
materials from their former employers. This will put the employee on
notice that the company does not condone the use of another company's
proprietary information.
3.DO investigate the types of projects and the projects' status if the
employee had signed an invention assignment agreement. This is a precautionary measure to guard against the use of the employee's former
employer's protectable information.
4.DO NOT place the employee in a position where he feels pressured to use his former employer's protectable trade secrets or confidential information. This is a precautionary method to prevent the employee
from disclosing forbidden information.
5.DO investigate the ownership of a contribution by an employee if
there is a reason to suspect that the employee may be using his previous
employer's trade secrets. The company is under a duty to investigate if it
has constructive notice that its new employee may be using trade secrets
belonging to his prior employer.
Conclusion
It is abundantly clear that California has a very strong public policy
of open competition. For example, while many states uphold covenants
restraining employees from competing against their former employers,
California passed a statute declaring that such covenants are unenforceable.' Similarly, California courts have repeatedly stated that competi-

225. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 ("[E]very contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void.")
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tors are free to solicit each other's employees. 6 There are only a few
forbidden actions: hiring a competitor's employee to steal trade secrets or
confidential information, or to hinder competition. Notwithstanding the
recent proliferation of lawsuits against employers who hire their competitors' employees, the California courts should continue the procompetition tradition. Thanks to this tradition, technology firms in the
Silicon Valley have flourished by building on one another's efforts. To
depart from this tradition is to undermine the foundation of Silicon Valley. With the support of the courts, employers with a genuine need for
technical talents and expertise may continue to compete for employees.

226. See Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 573,
577 (1994); Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 26 (Ct. App. 1968); Muggil v. Reuben
H. Donnelley Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal. 1965); Buxbom v. Smith, 145 P.2d. 305, 310
(Cal. 1944).

